We highlight aspects of the Brazilian operating and reporting environment that have led to ample opportunities for researchers to examine the topic of earnings management in financial reporting. In particular, we discuss the potential for research since Brazil has adopted a financial reporting system (IFRS) to replace its tax compliance system. Within that framework, we consider the role of other aspects of Brazil's environment, including the recent influx of foreign investment, the ability to choose corporate structure, and the implications of inflation on the incentives and opportunities for earnings management. As a guideline to researchers in Brazil, we have also provided a discussion of the applicability of testing those earnings properties most often tested in relation to earnings management, paying particular attention to issues that would be of interest beyond Brazil's borders.
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INTRODUCTION
n recent years, major changes within Brazil have led to many opportunities for accounting researchers to study earnings management. These opportunities, however, are not without their challenges. In this article, we focus on those issues that would be of significant interest to the major world economies, such as the US and Europe, but are unique to Brazil.
Since financial reporting is enforced by regulators and scrutinized by auditors, Healy and Wahlen (1999) point out that it becomes a low cost and credible means of managers to communicate with outsiders. A concern arises due to the need for managers to use their judgment in selecting reporting methods and making estimates. When managers choose reporting that better reflects their firm's economic reality, the outcome is more useful financial reporting. On the contrary, the communication breaks down when managers use reporting to either mislead stakeholders about performance or to influence contractual outcomes through earnings management.
Brazil's adoption of International Financial Reporting Standards(IFRS) in 2010, as a reporting regime, replaced their previously followed Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (BRGAAP) that were intended more for tax compliance than financial reporting.
The introduction of a reporting regime created incentives for earnings management. The question remains, however, whether IFRS is a high quality reporting regime that would limit the frequency and magnitude of earnings management. We initially focus on the impact of this shift in reporting regimes on communication.
The extent to which earnings management would influence the quality of communication under IFRS would likely depend on three characteristics of Brazil's economy.
The first influence would be the reclassification to investment grade of Brazil's markets in 2008, thus likely increasing the level of scrutiny over reporting. The second influence relates to managers being able to choose a corporate structure that would potentially result in a high level of corporate governance (with Novo Mercado), but without the burden of mandatory dividend payout rates (with Traditional Markets), an area not independent from the influence of foreign investment. Finally, the influence of creditors through the relatively high interest rates in Brazil would also likely provide additional oversight that would limit the ability to manage earnings.
We conclude with a discussion of how the various attributes of reporting quality would be related to earnings management. Based on this discussion, we recommend earnings 
ADOPTION OF IFRS
Since 2010, the consolidated financial statements of listed companies, including banks and insurance companies, are prepared using IFRS, but as adopted by Brazil's local standard setter, Comitê de Pronunciamentos Contábeis or CPC (PwC, 2013) . Like many countries, Brazil chose to exclude or modify some of the provisions of IFRS, and these exclusions and modifications are, perhaps, interesting areas for research. The most significant variations between IFRS and the CPC accounting pronouncements are Brazil's prohibition of firms to revalue property, plant, and equipment(except in the initial years of IFRS adoption) and to adopt changes in accounting pronouncements early, as well as the requirement to disclose individual financial statements, where the equity method is applied for investments in securities.
From a broader perspective, Brazil's adoption of any accounting system with the primary intent being financial reporting is interesting since, prior to 2010 the primary intent of BRGAAP was to provide guidelines for the calculation of taxable income. That is, Brazil went from one extreme, a compliance regime for tax purposes which provided little information to investors, to the other, a reporting regime equal to that of leading economic countries. This area is particularly fertile ground for research as it opens up several questions related to: newly created incentives for earnings management; Brazil's commitment to higher quality financial reporting that would limit the frequency and magnitude of earnings management; the influence of country-level differences with IFRS adoption; and more.
NEWLY CREATED INCENTIVES FOR EARNINGS MANAGEMENT
As IFRS becomes more fully ingrained within the Brazilian culture, it is likely that the financial markets would begin to depend on the information provided by financial reporting, and even begin to demand higher quality reporting. DEGEORGE, PATEL, ZECKHAUSER, 1999; DECHOW et al., 1996; DECHOW, GE, SCHRAND, 2010) .
According to Positive Accounting Theory (PAT), managers have incentives to report such that they: (i) avoid costly debt contracting; (ii) achieve their personal bonus payments;
and, (iii) avoid additional public scrutiny which often translates into additional costs for the firm (WATTS; ZIMMERMAN, 1986 ). Brazil's adoption of an accounting system (IFRS) that is intended primarily for financial reporting creates these incentives and provides managers with a tool to act on these incentives, tools that they lacked under the tax compliance regime.
Tests in more developed countries would focus on specific tools (i.e., accounting choices) used to achieve reporting goals, whereas researchers studying Brazil must first test the extent to which reporting incentives exist under the new reporting regime. 
COMMITMENT TO HIGHER QUALITY FINANCIAL REPORTING
Brazil's adoption of IFRS is also a signal to the world of its commitment to improving the quality of financial information in Brazil. Any improvements realized would likely be easier to detect in a setting like Brazil, where the switch was from a system primarily intended for tax compliance to a system primarily intended for financial reporting. On the contrary, improvements in the accounting standards in the US that would result in higher quality financial statements would likely be obfuscated by the existing high quality reporting regime. But with IRFS, Brazilian firms could now report opportunistically without cash flow effects, which previously would have directly resulted in greater tax costs.
INFLUENCE OF COUNTRY DIFFERENCES
The question of whether a country's national institutions and culture might influence the implementation of IFRS and, ultimately, its ability to curb earnings management, has had limited attention in the extant literature. One such study on the influence of the local country on the adoption of IFRS is Liao, Sellhorn and Skaife (2011), who provide evidence that financial reporting of France and Germany was comparable upon adopting IFRS, but subsequently diverged which would have shifted the incentives for earnings management. In this case, each country reverted back, somewhat, to their pre-adoption local GAAP.
A key difference in a study set in Europe to a study set in Brazil is that pre-adoption GAAP in these European countries was primarily intended as a reporting system where preadoption BRGAAP was primarily intended as a compliance system where there were limited incentives for (upward) earnings management. As such, there would not likely be the pressure by financial statement users to revert back to a former reporting system in Brazil, as was the case in France and Germany. Going forward, the financial information in Brazil will likely continue to improve under IFRS, where the advent of a reporting system will only fuel greater demands for high quality information.
INCREASED FOREIGN INVESTMENT
The increase of foreign investment in Brazil in recent years is another fertile area for research. In particular, the increase in foreign investment is likely to result in a related expansion of the investment opportunity set of Brazilian firms. Generally, growing firms with ample opportunities have fewer established assets in place and are thus compelled to exhibit higher reporting quality, such as recognizing losses more timely than a less conservative firm (KHAN; WATTS, 2009). Growth opportunities, however, also provide managers with greater discretion on the timing in which to recognize revenues and expenses, thus enhancing the potential for earnings management. Further, the increase in foreign investment would lead to greater separation of management and ownership. This separation would likely result in an agency problem that is also linked to the quality of financial reporting.
We expect that the extent to which foreign investors feel there is information asymmetry; they would act as monitors of financial reporting to reduce the potential for earnings management, similar to the role of institutional investors in the US. With the growth opportunities available to Brazil, the demand for, and benefits promised by IFRS (more principle based, less rules complexity, greater comparability, and more) are well timed.
Although, it is not clear which came first, the move toward improved financial reporting quality to attract foreign investors or the increased demand for quality financial reporting from foreign investors. This is yet another interesting question to explore. Specifically, researchers using Brazilian data can better identify whether higher quality reporting, and hence a commitment to reduced earnings management, is selected by managers to draw investors or if the foreign investment leads to high quality standards as an outcome. Given the level of complexity of investment and reporting in the US and other more mature markets, a similar study would be more difficult to execute.
While foreign investment provides new and interesting areas of research, it also poses problems related to the reliability of data. In particular, market data in Brazil likely lacks the efficiencies of market data in the US, since the infrequency of trading results in stock prices not being efficient in reflecting underlying public information (and hence firm value). This could be especially problematic when using the Basu (1997) returns model to identify timely loss recognition or when testing the price-earnings relation. For thinly traded stocks, other accounting quality attributes that are less affected by such a limitation might be better at assessing the influence of foreign investment. Ultimately, researchers would be able to explore whether oversight from foreign investors is a factor that reduces the frequency and/or magnitude of earnings management.
CHOICE OF CORPORATE STRUCTURE
The availability of different types of corporate structure in Brazil provides a setting in which to explore how firms resolve the agency problem when management is separated from ownership. On one hand, firms that choose the 'Traditional Market' structure is opting for less oversight, but in return, they must submit to mandatory distributions to shareholders. Mercado is an effective resolution to the problem of managers acting in their own self interests. The mandatory dividend provision of the Traditional Market structure implies that the oversight is insufficient to align the interests of managers with the firm or to discipline them when they act in their own self interest. As a possible signal of a firm's commitment to not manage earnings, many Traditional Market firms pay dividends in excess of the required amount. The adoption of IFRS allows researchers to test whether a high quality set of standards would allow firms to reduce the payment of excess dividends, but still be perceived as high quality.
The choices allowed public companies in the US are not on corporate structure, but on the level of oversight. Studies in the US on oversight typically test the influence of auditor size or expertise, or effects of the constraints imposed by debt covenants on earnings management. But evidence from studies using these choices is, by definition, less direct than the evidence from exploring whether the trade-off of corporate oversight and wealth distribution that exists in Brazil. Researchers will likely need to address the issue of selfselection; however, in order to ultimately address the endogeneity issues that often plague these types of studies.
INFLUENCE OF HIGH INTEREST AND INFLATION RATES
Although Brazil has outgrown its hyper-inflationary years leading up to and through the 1990's, it still has relatively high interest rates compared to the US and Europe. As such, trade credit becomes an attractive alternative to costly financing. For instance, Brazilian-based Petrobras extends trade credit to its suppliers, thereby providing them more affordable working capital (JAMES, 2011) . This leads to the question of how influential are short-term creditors who rely primarily on business relationships, relative to long-term creditors who traditionally rely on more formal debt covenants, to enforce their contracts and minimize earnings management.
Econometrically, high interest rates that characterize the operating environment of Brazilian firms pose some technical challenges for researchers. For example, earnings is commonly used as a summary performance measure in accounting research studies. In Brazil, this metric is traditionally downward skewed due to cost of doing business in Brazil.
Therefore, when designing a study that requires the use of this type of data variable, use of 
ATTRIBUTES OF REPORTING QUALITY
Dechow, Ge and Schrand (2010) identify three categories of the most commonly used proxies for financial reporting quality -qualities that would limit earnings management. The first category includes the properties of earnings: persistence, magnitude of accruals, residuals from accrual models, smoothness, timely loss recognition, and earnings benchmarks. The second category includes measures of investor responsiveness, which are market based.
External indicators of earnings misstatements make up the third category, which focuses on outlier performance. We discuss in more detail each of these proxies, highlighting the opportunities that Brazil offers accounting researchers to study earnings management.
EARNINGS PERSISTENCE
According to standard setters, the usefulness of financial reporting is, in part, defined by its predictive value (IASB 2010; FASB 2010 
MAGNITUDE OF ACCRUALS
A prevalent belief in the accounting literature is that the level of accruals, particularly discretionary or abnormal accruals, is inversely related to earnings quality (SLOAN, 1996; XIE, 2001) . Common methods of measuring the accruals are shown in equations (2a) through (2d).
Specific accrual components (2d)
Using abnormal accruals as a proxy for earnings management, Klein (2002) This metric could also be used to address the question of whether managers of Brazilian firms use the new channel of communication, IFRS, to report informatively or to manage earnings.
ACCRUAL RESIDUALS
Residuals from accrual models reflect the extent to which accruals do not map into cash flows. Whether due to intentional misstatements or unintentional errors, poor mapping identifies a mismatch of financial reporting with financial performance and indicates poor quality reporting. Intentional misstatements would be directly related to earnings management, where the unintentional errors would be related to the failure of the reporting regime (IFRS, in the case of Brazil) to limit the potential errors. Common methods of measuring the residuals of accruals are shown in equations (3a) through (3e).
Tot Curr Accrualst = α + β1Revenuet + β2PPEt + εt (3a)
Tot Curr Accrualst = α + β1(ΔRevenuet -ΔReceivablest) + β2PPEt + εt (3b) ΔWorking Capitalt = α + β1CFOt-1 + β2CFOt + β3CFOt+1 + εt (3d)
Tot Curr Accrualst = α + β1CFOt-1 + β2CFOt + β3CFOt+1 + β4ΔRevenuet + β4PPEt +εt (3e-1) σ(εt) = α + λ1Sizet + λ2σ(CFO)t + λ3σ(Rev)t + λ4log(OperCycle)t +λ5NegEarnt + νt (3e-2)
As with the magnitude of accruals, the accrual residuals can also be used to assess reporting quality related to Brazil's unique economic characteristics. For instance, is the level of foreign investment associated with a better mapping of accruals with cash flows? Similarly, are the Novo Mercado firms more likely to exhibit a better mapping than Traditional Market firms? Additionally, accrual-based metrics can be used to examine the extent to which accrual accounting can be used to manage earnings to minimize taxes or to avoid higher interest costs due to violations of accounting based debt covenants.
EARNINGS SMOOTHNESS
The extant literature suggests that smoothing generally results in higher quality reporting within the US, but elsewhere, smoothing has a negative impact on earnings quality 
Although smoothing is a direct result of earnings management, the perceived effect of smoothing on earnings quality would, according to Dechow, Ge, Schrand (2010) depend on the intent of smoothing. For instance, smoothing transitory earnings tends to provide a better picture of the firm's economic condition in the long term. Smoothing permanent earnings, however, serves to distort the firm's economic condition and thus decreases the decision usefulness of the information. Most of the research, however, on the differences in preferences for smoothing in the US versus elsewhere was performed in years prior to the widespread adoption of IFRS.
There appears to be a need for more research to determine if smoothness of earnings continues to be viewed differently in countries outside of the US, as more and more countries replace their local GAAP with presumably higher quality IFRS. Ball, Sadka and Robin (2008) suggests that since creditors contract on reported financial information, they, more than equity holders, demand financial reporting that "scores highly on traditional association-study metrics (page 169)". This is because association studies measure the efficiency in which financial statements reflect publicly available information. In this way, creditors are primed to act quickly, as soon as the financial statement-based covenants are tripped. A common measure of timely loss recognition is featured in equation (5).
where Dt= 1 if Returnst< 0.
Now that Brazil has put a reporting regime in place, higher quality firms will want to differentiate themselves through their reporting. If managers use their accounting choices to signal higher quality reporting, this is likely where we will observe conservatism in Brazil. At the extreme, however, excessive conservatism would be construed as a 'big bath' and would be another form of earnings management in which the manager is opportunistically shifting earnings to later periods. Areas already discussed -foreign investment, corporate structure, and interest -are all rich with opportunities to examine the role of conservatism in financial reporting.
This area of research is subject to some technical limitations. For instance, a primary method of testing for timely loss recognition, conservative reporting, is to use the reverse regression featured in Basu (1997 where there is generally less analyst following, perhaps the relevant benchmarks would not be forecasted earnings per share, but rather would be avoiding negative earnings or beating prior period earnings. Furthermore, analyst following is generally concentrated in a subset of the largest firms, leading to potentially biased samples.
INVESTOR RESPONSIVENESS
Investors are assumed to respond to information that aids them in their capital allocation decisions. Therefore, when reported earnings are of better quality, those earnings will have a stronger association with the firm value. Because these measures of reporting quality rely on the assumption of market efficiency, conclusions based on this approach would be difficult to form. We recommend that accounting researchers in Brazil utilize other metrics until such a time that the use of IFRS and the influx of foreign investors create a more efficient financial market. Of course, until that time, the prevailing question will be the extent to which market prices reflect publicly available information. 
EXTERNAL INDICATORS OF EARNINGS MISSTATEMENTS
When firms are forced to restate their financial reports or suffer some disciplinary action from an authoritative body, it is a clear indication of poor quality reporting. The primary disadvantage to using external indicators, such as restatements or disciplinary actions, is that there are relatively few instances resulting in small sample size. Further, these are the more extreme cases and thus are less generalizable. Considering the aforementioned limitations related to data availability, this proxy for earnings quality is unlikely to be useful for accounting researchers in Brazil.
CONCLUSION
In this article, we highlight the uniqueness that Brazil offers for accounting researchers in a time of significant changes in the world economy. To that end, we have identified major areas that we believe are the most promising for further research on the topic of earnings management. As a guideline to researchers in Brazil, we have also provided a discussion of the applicability of testing those earnings properties most often tested in relation to earnings management, paying particular attention to issues that would be of interest beyond Brazil's borders.
